




he U.S. distribution of labor earnings is highly skewed to the right.
Roughly, the lowest 50 percent of U.S. households, as measured by
individuallaborearnings,make10percentoftotallaborearnings. The
next lowest 30 percent earn approximately 30 percent and highest 10 percent
make 40 percent.1
Earnings are also related to a person’s position within a ﬁrm and employ-
ment at a particular ﬁrm. Within a ﬁrm earnings tend to be associated with
rank. The higher is an individual’s authority and control, the higher is his
compensation. The most extreme manifestation of this is the enormous pay
of the top executives of large ﬁrms. In 1996 the median pay of chief executive
ofﬁcers of companies in the S&P 500 index was nearly 2.5 million dollars
(Murphy 1999).
Across ﬁrms earnings tend to increase with ﬁrm size. This is particularly
true for executives. The elasticity of executive pay with respect to ﬁrm size is
in the range of 0.20 to 0.35 (Rosen 1992). Earnings for workers also increase
with ﬁrm size. This is the well-documented wage-size premium (Brown and
Medoff [1989] and Oi and Idson [1999]).
The standard neo-classical production function, where output equals a
function of aggregate labor and aggregate capital, cannot simultaneously ac-
count for these facts. It can generate an unequal distribution of earnings, if
somepeople’slaborismoreefﬁcientthanothers. Butithasonlyoneeconomy-
wide ﬁrm so it is necessarily silent on any relationship between earnings and
ﬁrm assignments. And even with respect to the distribution of earnings, the
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Weinberg for helpful comments. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily rep-
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1 These are 1998 numbers taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances as reported by
Rodriguez, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2002). They deﬁne labor earnings as wages
and salaries plus 85.7 percent of business and farm income.
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inequality of labor efﬁciency that would imply such a distribution seems so
unequal as to defy credulity.
For a theory to explain these facts, it needs to solve the problem of jointly
assigning workers and managers to ﬁrms. This paper sketches such a theory
that is based on the ﬁrm-size model of Lucas (1978) and on the hierarchy
models of Rosen (1982, 1992). For simplicity, most of the analysis focuses
on ﬁrms with only two types of jobs, executives and workers. This is enough
to illustrate the connection between pay and rank within and across ﬁrms; it
also has the advantage of allowing us to discuss the well-documented patterns
in executive pay.2
In a ﬁrm the role of a manager is more important than that of any sin-
gle worker, just as the role of the chief executive ofﬁcer is more important
than that of any subordinate, manager or worker. Firms are structured as
hierarchies in which decisions made by a high-level manager affect the pro-
ductivity of individuals in lower levels who report directly, or indirectly, to
the manager. Decisions made at each successively higher level in a ﬁrm affect
proportionately more people. Ultimately, the top executive’s decisions affect
the productivity of everyone within the ﬁrm. Figure 1 illustrates.
For this reason it matters a lot who is assigned to the top positions within
a ﬁrm. For a ﬁrm, a small difference in managerial talent at the highest level
leads to a big difference in output. As a consequence, within a ﬁrm it is best
to place the most talented individual at the top, while across ﬁrms it is best to
placethemosttalentedindividualatthelargestﬁrm. Forbothofthesereasons,
scarce managerial talent can be incredibly valuable. Within ﬁrms it leads to
earnings inequality over rank. Across ﬁrms it lead to earnings inequality over
ﬁrm size.
Section1studiesaproblemwherepeopleareassignedtobeeitherworkers
or managers. All ﬁrms are a hierarchy with one level of management. This
model is a simpliﬁcation of Lucas (1978). Short discussions of executive pay,
the wage-size premium, and marginal product pricing in assignment models
are included. Section 2 studies a simple extension of the Lucas model to
incorporate multi-level hierarchies as in Rosen (1982). Section 3 provides a
concluding discussion.
1. TWO-LEVEL FIRMS
All production in this economy is done by ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm consists of a
managerandanumberofworkers. Aﬁrm’sproductiondependsonthetalentof
2 Much of the recent literature on executive compensation has focused on the important ques-
tion of how to pay executives in order to motivate them to act in the best interests of the cor-
poration. That issue is not discussed in this paper. Surveys can be found in Rosen (1992) and
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Notes: A three-level ﬁrm in which decisions made by a manager affect the productivity
of all individuals who directly and indirectly report to him. The single individual at the
top is the executive, the three individuals at the second level are lower-level managers,
and the remaining nine individuals are workers.
themanagerandtheamountoflaborsuppliedbytheworkers. Theproduction
function is tf(l), where t is the talent of the manager and l is the number of
workers working for him. The function f(l)is concave so given a manager
there is decreasing returns to scale in the number of workers who work for
him. Decreasing returns at the ﬁrm level will lead to the existence of multiple
ﬁrms rather than just one large ﬁrm with everyone working under the most
talented manager. The number of workers working for a manager is often
called a manager’s span of control. The more talented a manager is the more
workers who work for him, and the larger is his span of control.
Peopledifferintheirmanagerialtalent. Talentisdistributedbyh(t)across
the population. H(t) is the cumulative distribution function. There is an
indivisibility in an individual’s job. A person can either be a manager or
a worker, but not both at the same time. The problem in this economy is to
determinewhowillbeamanagerandthenhowmanyworkerswillbeassigned
to each manager.72 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Each person must decide whether to be a worker or a manager. If he
chooses to be a worker then he receives the labor wage of w, which is inde-
pendentofhistalent. Ifhechoosestobeamanager, hemustdecidehowmuch




The ﬁrst-order condition is
tf  (l) − w = 0. (1)
A manager’s earnings π is equal to tf(l)−wl. Naturally, a manager must
be paid at least as much as the wage or he would choose to be a worker. Since
managerial earnings are increasing in talent there is a unique cutoff level of
talent z for which all people with t ≥ z are managers and the rest are workers.
Let l(t)be the labor hired by a manager of talent t. Then,
zf(l(z)) − wl(z) = w. (2)
This condition just states that a marginal manager’s proﬁt, zf(l(z)) − wl(z),
equals his opportunity cost of working, w.
There is also a resource constraint on the supply of labor. It is
 ∞
z
l(t)dH(t) ≤ H(z). (3)
The left-hand side is labor hired while the right-hand side is labor supplied.
A competitive equilibrium is a cutoff level of talent z, an assignment of
labor to managers l(t) for t ≥ z, and a wage w that satisﬁes the managers’
ﬁrst-order conditions, that is, (1) for all t ≥ z, indifference for the marginal
manager (2), and the resource constraint (3).
To illustrate the connection between ﬁrms and pay, we study the case
where f(l)= lα with 0 <α<1. The number of employees assigned to a
ﬁrm, l(t), can be determined from (1). It satisﬁes
l(t) = (w/α)1/(α−1)t1/(1−α).
Because α is between zero and one, the number of employees grows more
than proportionately with the manager’s talent. Another measure of ﬁrm size
is ﬁrm revenue or output q(t). Its relationship with talent is nearly identical
to that of l(t).I ti s
q(t) = tl(t)α = (w/α)α/(α−1)t1/(1−α). (4)
A similar relationship holds for managerial pay. Then,




Managerial pay grows more than proportionately with talent. Small differ-
encesintalentatthemanageriallevelleadtolargedifferencesinpay(andﬁrm
size). The result is appealing because it implies that even with a symmetricE.S. Prescott: Firms,Assignments, and Earnings 73
Figure 2 Earnings and Talent
Notes: Earnings as a function of talent. All individuals with talent t<zare assigned
to be workers and earn wages w. Individuals with more managerial talent are managers
and their pay is an increasing convex function of their talent.
distribution of talent, which has some natural appeal, earnings and ﬁrm size
will be skewed to the right, as is observed in the data.3 Figure 2 illustrates the
relationship between talent and earnings in this example.
Whiletherelationshipofﬁrmsizeandexecutivepaytotalentisofinterest,
the applicability of these theoretical results is limited. The talent distribution
is not observed and there is little hope of directly observing it. However, the
theory does predict a relationship between ﬁrm size and executive pay that,
for this example, is independent of the talent distribution or talent level. The







3 Like the earnings distribution, ﬁrm size is highly skewed to the right. This is true for a
variety of ﬁrm size measures like assets, employment, sales, and others. See Simon and Bonini
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Managerial pay with respect to ﬁrm size, as measured by q(t),i s
π(t)= q(t)− wl(t) = (1 − α)q(t). (7)
In this example, managerial pay is linear in ﬁrm size. (It is also linear in ﬁrm
size if ﬁrm size is deﬁned as number of employees.)
Implications for Executive Pay
Qualitatively, the theory seems on the mark. Executive pay grows with ﬁrm
size. Quantitatively, however, some other functional form is needed. In the
data the log of executive pay is linear in the log of ﬁrm size, which means that
the level of executive pay takes the form
pay = b(size)β. (8)
Numerous studies ﬁnd that the elasticity, β, is around 0.20-0.35. Elasticities
inthisrangehavebeenfoundinU.S.dataduringthe1940sand1950s(Roberts
1956), U.S. data in the late 1930s (Kostiuk 1989), U.S. data from 1969–1981
(Kostiuk 1989), U.K. data during 1969–1971 (Cosh 1975), and U.S. banking
data in the 1980s (Barro and Barro 1990). See Rosen (1992) and Murphy
(1999) for more discussion.
One important feature of the data that the model is silent on is the large
increase in the ratio of executive pay to worker pay observed over the last 30
years. In 1970 the average executive of an S&P 500 ﬁrm made 30 times the
average worker wage. In 1996 this ratio was 90 for cash compensation and
210 for realized compensation, which includes the value of exercised stock
options (Murphy 1999).
One strategy for addressing this question is to postulate that there was an
exogenous change in the technology by changing the production technology
to tAf(l(t)), where A>1, and f is homogenous of degree α. Interestingly,
this has no effect on the economy except to raise everyone’s wealth by a
factor of A. In particular, set the new wage to Aw and keep the z and the
l(t)unchanged from the above model. This allocation satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
conditions. Worker pay grows by the factor A and so does managerial pay.
Managersstillsupervisethesamenumberofpeopleandwagesandmanagerial
rents increase by the constant factor.
Morepromisingstrategiesincludepostulatinganexogenouschangeinthe
span of control technology, say, from advances in information technology, or
by introducing capital. Lucas (1978) includes capital so that the production
function is tf(g(l,k)), where g is a constant returns-to-scale technology. In
his model, as an economy grows wealthier the capital-to-labor ratio in ﬁrms
increases, there are less ﬁrms, and ﬁrm size increases. These forces increase
executivepay, thoughthepreciseeffectontheratioofexecutivetoworkerpay
is unclear because wages increase as well. Still, the growth in executive payE.S. Prescott: Firms,Assignments, and Earnings 75
in the last 30 years seems much greater than can be accounted for by changes
in the capital stock so one would guess that other factors are also at work.
Talent as a Worker Input
In the simple model of the previous section there was a constant wage for all
workers. A worker was paid the same no matter what ﬁrm employed him.
In the data, however, there is a premium for working for a larger ﬁrm. This
well-documentedobservationhasbeenreportedbyBrownandMedoff(1989),
Idson and Oi (1999), Oi and Idson (1999), Troske (1999), and others. Idson
and Oi (1999) report an elasticity of wages with respect to plant size of 0.075
using 1992 data from the Census of Manufactures. This size elasticity implies
that an employee who works for a plant that is twice the size of another plant
earns 5 percent more than an employee at the smaller plant.
In this section, we modify the production function to allow talent to affect
output at the worker level as well as at the managerial level. This will add
more earnings inequality. Alone it does not necessarily generate a wage-size
premium but it does give some insight into what might generate it.
Let d(t) be the total talent of workers assigned to manager t and let






The ﬁrst-order condition is nearly identical to that of the previous problem. It
is
tf  (d) − w = 0. (9)
Marginal managers are indifferent to managing and working. This condition
is
zf(d(z)) − d(z)w = zw. (10)
Notice that now the opportunity cost of managing is the marginal manager’s
talent times the wage.







The primary advantage of this formulation is that worker pay varies with
talent. Figure 3 describes the dependence of pay on talent for the production
function f(d)= dα. Unlike the previous model, worker pay now varies and
is linear with talent. However, the relationship between managerial talent and
managerial pay is identical to that in the previous model. The connection
between ﬁrm size and managerial pay is also the same.76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Earnings and Talent
Notes: Earnings as a function of talent when talent is also an input into production. All
individuals with talent t<zare assigned to be workers and earn wages wt. Individuals
with more managerial talent are managers and their pay is an increasing convex function
in their talent.
The model is silent, however, on worker pay and ﬁrm size because for
any given level of talent supplied to a ﬁrm, there are many combinations of
differentiallytalentedworkersthatcanprovidethattotalamountoftalent. For
example, a ﬁrm could have a small number of highly talented individuals or
a large number of less talented individuals. Still, if there was a reason for
the most talented workers to be assigned to the most talented managers and
so on down the talent ladder until everyone was assigned, then there would
be a wage-size premium. This kind of matching is referred to as positive
assortative matching. One way to generate such a reason would be to make
the production function highly complementary in the talent of the managers
andworkers. Kremer(1993)studiesonesuchﬁrm-levelproductionfunctionin
whichseveraltasksneedtobeperformedsimultaneously. Ifany ofthesetasks
are performed unsuccessfully, then no output is produced. Talent improves
the probability of success so this form of complementarity generates positive
assortative matching and a positive wage-size premium.E.S. Prescott: Firms,Assignments, and Earnings 77
Marginal Product
Inthismodelallfactorsarepaidtheirmarginalproduct. Thismightnotappear
to be the case if one was to use the ﬁrm-level production function, tf(l(t)),t o
determinemarginalproduct. However,thatisnottherightproductionfunction
for determining the margin.




them into ﬁrms, and produces the output. Firms are really an intermediate
good. The production function at the economy level is linear in these inputs
so factors are paid their marginal products as in classical distribution theory.









l(t)dH(t) ≤ H(z). (12)
The inputs into this production sector are the numbers of each type t. The
supply of these inputs is, of course, the distribution h(t). The economy is
linear, or constant returns to scale, in the input. If w is the multiplier to (12)
then the marginal product of t ≥ z is tf(l(t)) − wl(t) and of t<zis w.
Managers are paid what is left over. Their pay is a residual, which is called a
rent in the Ricardian tradition, but it is still a marginal product with respect to
the production sector.
2. MULTIPLE-LEVEL HIERARCHIES
Extending the basic assignment model to hierarchies with more than two
levels is conceptually straightforward, but it can be difﬁcult analytically. In
this section, a simple extension is provided.4 The purpose is to generate a
production hierarchy, like that illustrated in Figure 1, to introduce slightly
more complicated managerial production functions, and to discuss relative
pay levels between levels of management.
Production is limited to three-level hierarchies. As before, workers and
managers jointly produce a good according to the production function tf(l).
However, this good is no longer ﬁnal output but an intermediate good that is
usedbyasecond-levelmanagertoproducetheﬁnaloutput. Lettheintermedi-
ate good be called m. Final output is tg(m), where t is the talent of the second
4 See Rosen (1992) for analysis of a problem where managers have a ﬁxed span of control.78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
level manager. The intermediate goods are used to create a tractable example.
The goal is to model ﬁrms organized like those illustrated in Figure 1.
Thepriceofaunitoftheintermediategoodisλand,asbefore,thepriceof
laborisw. Weneedtosolveforanassignmentoflabortolevel-onemanagers,
l(t), an assignment of the intermediate good to level-two managers, m(t), and
cutoff values z1 and z2 that correspond to the cutoff talent levels between
workers and level-one managers and between level-one managers and level-
two managers, respectively.
The competitive equilibrium is set up so that the level-one manager hires
the labor and creates the intermediate good, which he sells to the level-two
managers. Despite this separation, we will interpret the level-one managers
and workers who create the intermediate good for a level-two manager as
being within the same ﬁrm. The problem can be formally set up in this way,
but it is much more complicated to write down.




The ﬁrst-order condition is
tg (m) − λ = 0. (13)
The marginal level-two manager, z1, must be indifferent to working as a level-
one manager, that is,
z2g(m(z2)) − λm(z2) = λz2f(l(z 2)) − wl(z2). (14)




The ﬁrst-order condition is
λtf  (l) − w = 0. (15)
The marginal level-one manager, z2, must be indifferent to working as a
worker,
λz1f(l(z 1)) − wl(z1) = w. (16)
The ﬁnal conditions for a competitive equilibrium are the resource con-
straints that the intermediate good used by level-two managers equals the








and that the labor used by level-one managers equals the labor supplied
 z2
z1
l(t)dH(t) ≤ H(z1). (18)E.S. Prescott: Firms,Assignments, and Earnings 79
With these formulas, we can derive similar relationships to those derived
earlier. For all managers at the same level in a hierarchy, the relationship of
paywithrespecttotalentlooksimilartothosestudiedearlier. Thecurvatureof
pay with respect to talent may differ between managers assigned to different
levels of a hierarchy. This will depend on the properties of the production
functions f and g. These functions need not be the same since managing
at lower levels within a ﬁrm may be very different than managing at higher
levels.
A commonly observed feature of managerial pay within a ﬁrm is that
there is a much larger difference in pay between levels of a hierarchy than
within given job classiﬁcations (Rosen 1992). In our simple model, such a
feature could be obtained if level-one managers were appropriately assigned
to level-two managers. But more generally, it would be desirable to formalize
the model so that it mattered which level-one manager was assigned to which
level-two manager. This brings up the issue of positive assortative matching
raisedearlierinourdiscussionofthewage-sizepremium. Theseeffectswould
seem to matter for junior executives as well.
3. CONCLUSION
The hierarchy illustrated by Figure 1 captures some features of ﬁrms, but it
really postulates that each branch within a ﬁrm operates separately from the
others. Some parts of a ﬁrm operate in this way, but there are others, like
personnel, maintenance, legal, and audit, that provide services to all parts of a
ﬁrm. Their outputs are essentially intermediate inputs into the production of
the ﬁnal output by other parts of the ﬁrm. The literature rarely considers these
features, yet if ﬁrms do anything special, it is that they do joint production
of activities that are not as efﬁciently supplied on the market. It would seem
desirabletointroducethesefeaturesintosomeoftheﬁrmproductionfunctions
that have been studied in the literature.
Finally, the model considered here is a static model. If taken to a dynamic
environment,thenthestrategywouldbetoassumethatmanagersandﬁrmsare
reallocated each period to whichever type of ﬁrm the market sees ﬁt to assign
them. Forsomepurposes,thatabstractionisﬁnebutitmissesaveryimportant
part of the managerial assignment problem. Managers infrequently move
betweenﬁrms. Indeed,animportantactivityofaﬁrmistoidentifyanddevelop
managerial talent for future promotion through its ranks. The career ladder
within a ﬁrm is a very important device for solving this assignment problem
and to an extent it operates separately from the market. Understanding this
mechanismmightbequiteimportantforunderstandingtheinternaldistribution
of pay between levels of a hierarchy within a ﬁrm. For some work along this80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
line see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Meyer (1994), or the papers surveyed in
Rosen (1992).
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